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ANIMALS—REGULATION—SEARCHES, SEIZURES, INSPECTIONS
AND FORFEITURES
IN RE PETERSON’S DOGS
In In re Peterson’s Dogs,1 Lila Peterson appealed the district court’s
order finding she could not care for her dogs and ordering the State not to
return the animals to her.2 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
district court’s order, holding the State had probable cause to confiscate the
dogs and the district court did not err in concluding Peterson could not
provide adequate care for them.3
On February 7, 2008, Deputy Sheriff James Hulm visited Peterson’s
home in response to a report of possible animal abuse.4 Peterson showed
Hulm the basement where she raised Chihuahua dogs.5 She also allowed
Hulm to take pictures of the area.6 On March 1, 2008, Hulm returned to
Peterson’s home, this time accompanied by a number of deputy sheriffs and
Central Humane Society employees.7 Together, they removed forty-seven
dogs from Peterson’s home.8
At the time of confiscation, Hulm provided Peterson with two forms—
a relinquishment of ownership form and a “Notice of Confiscation” form.9
The relinquishment of ownership form effectively waived any future claims
to the Chihuahuas.10 The “Notice of Confiscation” form, on the other hand,
stated Peterson had five days to claim the dogs.11 Peterson signed both
forms during the confiscation on March 1, 2008.12 Five days later, on
March 6, 2008, Peterson contacted the sheriff’s department demanding the
dogs be returned to her or, in the alternative, demanding a court hearing to
challenge the validity of the dogs’ confiscation.13
Following Peterson’s request, the district court scheduled a hearing.14
The State moved for a cancellation of the hearing, asserting Peterson had
1. 2009 ND 206, 776 N.W.2d 52.
2. Peterson’s Dogs, ¶ 1, 776 N.W.2d at 53.
3. Id.
4. Id. ¶¶ 2, 6, 776 N.W.2d at 53-54.
5. Id. ¶ 2, 776 N.W.3d at 53.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. ¶ 3.
10. Id.
11. Id., 776 N.W.2d at 54.
12. Id., 776 N.W.2d at 53.
13. Id., 776 N.W.2d at 54.
14. Id. ¶ 4.
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waived her right to a hearing when she signed the relinquishment of ownership form.15 The district court granted the State’s motion, and Peterson
appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.16 The supreme court held the
district court erred in cancelling the hearing and remanded the case for
further proceedings.17
Accordingly, the district court held a two-day evidentiary hearing to
determine if Peterson had voluntarily relinquished her rights to the dogs.18
The district court found the two forms Hulm provided to Peterson were
conflicting and concluded that, given the conflicting nature of the forms,
Peterson did not voluntarily relinquish the dogs to the sheriff’s department.19 Next, the district court considered whether Peterson was capable of
providing adequate care for the dogs.20 The district court heard the testimony from five individuals on the matter.21
First, the district court heard from Deputy Sheriff Hulm who testified
his visit to Peterson’s home revealed: Peterson had over sixty dogs in only
two kennels; the dogs had no way to enter or exit the kennels; and the kennels had no food or water in them.22 The district court then heard testimony
from two individuals who assisted Hulm in confiscating the dogs on March
1, 2008.23 The first individual testified “the dogs were not exposed to cold
or inclement weather[,]” and food and water were readily available to
them.24 The other individual testified “one mother chihuahua appeared
dehydrated and several puppies needed supplemental feeding.”25 The
individual also testified she observed a spaniel, with numerous bite wounds,
that appeared to be malnourished, and the individual found Peterson’s basement to be too dark and too small for raising that number of dogs.26 In her
testimony, Peterson stated she was raising seventy-five dogs in her basement and explained she provided food and water and cleaned the dogs’
kennels three times a day.27 The last witness, the president of the Bismarck

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
Id.
See id. ¶¶ 6-9, 776 N.W.2d at 54-55.
Id. ¶ 6, 776 N.W.2d at 54.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id., 776 N.W.2d at 54-55.
Id., 776 N.W.2d at 55.
Id.
Id. ¶ 8.

440

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:437

Kennel Club, testified his examination of Peterson’s basement revealed the
environment was “perfectly satisfactory for Chihuahuas.”28
After the hearing, the district court issued a memorandum opinion and
order, finding Peterson’s basement was too small and not clean enough for
raising seventy-five dogs.29 Thus, the district court concluded Peterson
could not adequately care for the dogs and ordered the State not to return
the dogs to her care.30 Peterson appealed, arguing the State lacked probable
cause to confiscate the dogs.31 The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed,
explaining under section 36-21.1-06(1) of the North Dakota Century Code,
“Any sheriff, police officer, licensed veterinarian, or investigator may take
custody of and care for any animal unjustly exposed to cold or inclement
weather or not properly fed or watered.”32 Based on the observations of
Deputy Sheriff Hulm and another individual present during the confiscation, the State had probable cause to confiscate the animals on the ground
Peterson did not properly feed or water the dogs.33
After determining the State had probable cause to confiscate the dogs,
the supreme court recognized the State was required to notify Peterson she
had five days to redeem her dogs following the confiscation.34 However,
before the State could return the dogs to Peterson, the district court had ten
days to determine whether Peterson could provide adequate care for the
animals.35 The district court found Peterson was not capable of adequately
caring for the dogs and ordered the State not to return the dogs to her care.36
The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s finding,
applying a clearly erroneous standard of review.37
On appeal, Peterson argued section 36-21.1-06(8) required the district
court to determine whether Peterson could provide adequate care for her
dogs, rather than whether she had provided adequate care in the past.38 The
supreme court agreed with Peterson’s interpretation of the relevant statutory
language, but explained the section did not “preclude district courts from
considering evidence of an owner’s past care” in determining an owner’s

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 36-21.1-06(1) (2009)).
Id. ¶ 12, 776 N.W.2d. at 56.
Id. ¶ 13 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 36-21.1-06(1), (3)).
Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 36-21.1-06(8)).
Id.
Id. ¶ 14 (citing Aasmunstad v. State, 2008 ND 206, ¶ 16, 763 N.W.2d 748, 756-57).
Id. ¶ 15.
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ability to adequately care for animals.39 The supreme court further explained while there was testimony in the record to support a finding Peterson had
adequately cared for her dogs in the past, there was also testimony establishing Peterson could not care for the dogs if they were returned to her.40
Because a district court’s choice between two permissible views does not
constitute clear error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district
court’s order, concluding the district court’s findings were not clearly
erroneous.41

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. ¶¶ 15-16, 776 N.W.2d at 56-57.
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CIVIL COMMITMENTS—SEXUALLY DANGEROUS INDIVIDUALS
IN RE VOISINE
In In re Voisine,42 Raymond J. Voisine appealed his commitment to the
care, custody, and control of the Department of Human Services after a district court found him a sexually dangerous individual.43 The North Dakota
Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order, holding the district court
erred in concluding incest between consenting adults constituted sexually
predatory conduct, and for failing to make specific findings on two prongs
of the test for sexually dangerous individuals.44
In 2003, an officer searched Voisine’s apartment for firearms.45 During the search, the officer found sexually explicit photographs of Voisine’s
daughter under his pillow.46 After an investigation, it was established
Voisine had fathered two children with his daughter.47 Furthermore, interviews with Voisine’s family members revealed Voisine had engaged in
sexual acts with one of his grandsons who was six or seven years old at the
time.48 The State subsequently charged Voisine with gross sexual imposition for the sexual contact with his grandson.49 Voisine pleaded guilty to
the charge and was incarcerated until his release in 2008.50
Following Voisine’s release, the State petitioned the district court to
commit him as a sexually dangerous individual.51 In support of its petition,
the State asserted Voisine had three children with two of his daughters,
abused his children when they were minors, and promoted obscenity to his
minor grandson.52 Voisine denied the allegations, but the district court
found probable cause to detain him.53 The district court also scheduled a
commitment hearing.54 At the hearing, expert reports on whether Voisine
was a sexually dangerous individual were presented and considered by the
district court.55 Based on the evidence, the district court found the incest
between Voisine and his daughters to be sexually predatory conduct and
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

2010 ND 17, 777 N.W.2d 908.
Voisine, ¶ 1, 777 N.W.2d at 909.
Id., 777 N.W.2d at 909-10.
Id. ¶ 2, 777 N.W.2d at 910.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6.
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concluded Voisine was likely to engage in such conduct again.56 Accordingly, the district court ordered Voisine committed to the care, custody, and
control of the Department of Human Services.57
Voisine appealed the district court’s order, arguing the court erred in
applying the sexually dangerous individual analysis.58 The North Dakota
Supreme Court stated in commitment proceedings, the State bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence the individual has:
[1] engaged in sexually predatory conduct . . . [2] has a . . .
condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction that [3] makes that
individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory
conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health
or safety of others.59
The Supreme Court further explained the North Dakota Century Code
defines “sexually predatory conduct” as “engaging or attempting to engage
in a sexual act or contact with another” through the application of force,
threat of force, or the use of intoxicants.60 In addition, when the victim is
unaware of the sexual contact, is under the age of fifteen, or has a mental
disability that prevents the victim from understanding the nature of the act,
and the actor is aware of it, the actor has engaged in sexually predatory
conduct.61 Finally, the court noted the statute also defines as sexually
predatory any sexual contact between a minor victim and an adult actor,
including the situation when the actor is also the parent of the victim.62
However, the court stated, although morally and criminally reprehensible,
incest between consenting adults does not fall within the statutory definition
of sexually predatory conduct.63
In ordering Voisine committed, the district court determined the
incestuous contact between him and his daughters constituted sexually
predatory conduct and was a breach of his parental duties.64 The North
Dakota Supreme Court held the district court’s findings were clearly erroneous because incest between consenting adults is not sexually predatory.65
Moreover, because the identification of the sexually predatory conduct
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id., 777 N.W.2d at 910-11.
Id., 777 N.W.2d at 910.
Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 777 N.W.2d at 911.
Id. ¶ 9 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01(8) (2009)).
Id. ¶ 10 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01(9) (2009)).
Id., 777 N.W.2d at 911-12.
Id., 777 N.W.2d at 912.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id.
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plays a role in each step of the sexually dangerous individual analysis, the
district court’s erroneous view of the law likely affected its conclusion
Voisine was a sexually dangerous individual.66 The court explained
although Voisine’s sexual contact with his grandson could have satisfied
the first prong of the analysis, the district court’s failure to make specific
findings about the prong, other than those related to the incestuous conduct,
was a legal error.67 The court also concluded the district court erred in the
second prong of the analysis by failing to make any findings about
Voisine’s sexual, personality, or mental disorder.68 Finally, the supreme
court stated the district court properly relied on Voisine’s prior behavior
and on the experts’ reports presented at the commitment hearing in
determining Voisine was likely to engage in future acts of sexually
predatory conduct.69 However, because the district court erred in finding
incest between consenting adults was sexually predatory conduct and failed
to make specific findings as to the first and second prong of the sexually
dangerous individual analysis, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed
the commitment order and remanded for further proceedings.70

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. ¶ 12, 777 N.W.2d at 912-13.
Id., 777 N.W.2d at 913.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶ 15.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE—POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
PROCEEDINGS—MOTIONS
DELVO V. STATE
In Delvo v. State,71 Jessica Delvo appealed the district court’s summary
dismissal of her application for post-conviction relief.72 The North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order, holding summary dismissal of the post-conviction relief application was proper because Delvo
failed to present affidavits or other evidence in support of her application
after she was put on notice the State was seeking summary disposition.73
In 2005, Delvo pleaded guilty to certain drug-related charges.74 The
district court placed her on probation.75 In 2008, the State sought to revoke
Delvo’s probation, asserting fourteen separate grounds for its request.76
The district court held a probation hearing at which Delvo admitted to four
of the State’s allegations, including her conviction of ingesting a controlled
substance, forgery, and possession of marijuana.77 Delvo’s probation officer also testified at the hearing.78 Based on Delvo’s admissions at the
probation hearing, the district court revoked her probation.79
In 2009, Delvo applied for post-conviction relief, asserting three
grounds for her application.80 First, Delvo argued she did not voluntarily
and knowingly make the admissions at the probation hearing.81 Second,
Delvo asserted her admissions were unlawfully induced because the State
had failed to disclose evidence favorable to her application.82 Finally,
Delvo claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based on her attorney’s
failure to pursue perjury charges against her probation officer who allegedly
gave false testimony at the hearing.83
The State responded and requested a summary dismissal of Delvo’s
application.84 The State did not make a separate motion, but rather argued

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

2010 ND 78, 782 N.W.2d 72.
Delvo, ¶ 1, 782 N.W.2d at 73.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶¶ 3-4.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6, 782 N.W.2d at 73-74.
Id.
Id., 782 N.W.2d at 74.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.

446

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:437

in its response the district court should deny Delvo’s application.85 Delvo
did not amend her application after the State filed its response.86 The
district court, finding no genuine issue of material fact existed, chose not to
hold a hearing on the matter and summarily dismissed Delvo’s
application.87
On appeal, Delvo argued the district court erred in summarily dismissing her application and in not holding an evidentiary hearing.88 Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice VandeWalle first explained post-conviction
relief proceedings are civil in nature and are governed accordingly by the
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.89 Moreover, when reviewing a
summary denial of an application for post-conviction relief, the North
Dakota Supreme Court applies a standard of review similar to the standard
for reviewing a summary judgment.90 Thus, “[t]he party opposing the
motion for summary disposition is entitled to all reasonable inferences at
the preliminary stages of a post-conviction proceeding and is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing if a reasonable inference raises a genuine issue of
material fact.”91
The court then explained section 29-32.1-09(1) of the North Dakota
Century Code allows a district court, upon a motion by either party, to summarily dismiss an application for post-conviction relief if no genuine issue
of material fact exists and the party making the motion is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.92 If the State moves for summary dismissal,
the applicant must present evidence in support of her application.93 Thus,
the court emphasized, an applicant for post-conviction relief is not required
to present evidentiary support for her application until she is given notice
the State is putting her to her proof.94 Once the applicant receives notice,
however, she “must present competent admissible evidence by affidavit or
other comparable means which raises an issue of material fact” and may not
simply rely on conclusory allegations.95

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. ¶ 8.
88. Id. ¶ 9.
89. Id. ¶ 10 (citing Clark v. State, 2008 ND 234, ¶ 11, 758 N.W.2d 900, 905). Chief Justice
VandeWalle delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Maring and Justice Sandstrom
joined.
90. Id. (citing Henke v. State, 2009 ND 117, ¶ 9, 767 N.W.2d 881, 884).
91. Id. (quoting Berlin v. State, 2005 ND 110, ¶ 6, 698 N.W.2d 266, 269).
92. Id. ¶ 12, 782 N.W.2d at 75 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32.1-09(1) (2009)).
93. Id. (citing Henke, ¶ 11, 767 N.W.2d at 885).
94. Id. (quoting State v. Bender, 1998 ND 72, ¶ 20, 576 N.W.2d 210, 214).
95. Id. (quoting Bender, ¶ 20).
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In affirming the district court’s summary denial of Delvo’s application,
the majority focused on whether the State put Delvo to her proof.96 The
majority explained although the district court did not hold an evidentiary
hearing after the State requested summary dismissal, Delvo conceded she
had notice she was put to her proof.97 Furthermore, Delvo did not contest
the manner in which the State requested summary dismissal—response,
rather than a motion.98 Accordingly, Delvo had notice and was required to
present evidence in support of her application.99 Because Delvo failed to
offer any evidence, which could raise a genuine issue of material fact, the
district court did not err in summarily denying her application for postconviction relief.100
Justice Crothers filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Kapsner.101 The dissent stated summary denial of the application for postconviction relief was not proper because “Delvo had no chance to make any
argument in the district court because her action was dismissed without
notice and without a motion by the State.”102 Justice Crothers explained the
majority erred in concluding the State put Delvo to her proof by simply
filing an answer to her application.103 The majority’s conclusion, the dissent noted, contradicted the requirements set forth both in the post-conviction relief statute and in the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.104
Neither law requires an application for post-conviction relief to contain specific evidence and neither obliges an applicant to respond to an answer.105
The record on appeal showed, the dissent noted, the State failed to
timely respond to Delvo’s application and discovery requests.106 In fact, the
State did not file an answer until the district court scheduled a hearing on
the matter.107 Even then, the State’s answer contained mere allegations the
State was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.108 Therefore, the dissent
concluded Delvo had no notice she was put to her proof.109 Because Delvo
did not have an opportunity to supply her proof and because the district
96. Id. ¶ 13.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. ¶ 17, 782 N.W.2d at 76.
101. Id. ¶¶ 19, 36.
102. Id. ¶ 21, 782 N.W.2d at 77 (Crothers, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
103. Id. ¶ 22.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. ¶ 23.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. ¶ 24.
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court summarily denied her application without holding an evidentiary
hearing, the district court’s order constituted legal error.110
The dissent explained in post-conviction relief proceedings, the State
may respond to an application either by filing an answer or by filing a motion to dismiss.111 The State in the present case chose to file an answer and
referenced in its answer allegations the propriety of summary denial.112
However, a district court may summarily deny an application for postconviction relief only after the State files a motion.113 An answer, the
dissent stated, is not a motion.114
Citing the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, the dissent
explained a motion must be in writing and must state with specificity the
grounds for the motion and the relief sought.115 On the other hand, an
answer is simply one of the forms of pleadings, which addresses the merits
of the case by usually denying the allegations set forth in the complaint.116
Moreover, the dissent explained while the North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure allow certain defenses to be raised by motion, rather than in an
answer, no law allows “a defense to be alleged in an answer and then
adjudicated as if a motion had been made.”117 The dissent further noted the
primary purpose of a motion is to put both the court and the opposing party
on notice regarding the nature of the claims and the relief sought.118 By
using the State’s answer as a motion, the dissent concluded, the district
court effectively deprived Delvo of her constitutional right to notice and
opportunity to be heard.119 Because the State failed to file and serve a
motion requesting summary dismissal, Delvo did not have notice she was
being put to her proof.120 Therefore, the dissent stated, Delvo was not
required to present evidentiary support after the State filed its answer, and
the district court erred in summarily denying her application for postconviction relief.121

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id., 782 N.W.2d at 77-78.
Id. ¶ 26, 782 N.W.2d at 78.
Id.
Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32.1-09(1) (2009)).
Id. ¶ 28.
Id. (quoting N.D. R. CIV. P. 7(b)(1)).
Id. ¶ 29 (citing N.D. R. CIV. P. 7(a)).
Id. ¶ 31, 782 N.W.2d at 79 (citing N.D. R. CIV. P. 12(b)).
Id. ¶ 32 (citing Vande Hoven v. Vande Hoven, 399 N.W.2d 855, 859 (N.D. 1987)).
Id. ¶ 33.
Id. ¶ 35, 782 N.W.2d at 79-80.
Id.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FIGHTING WORDS—ADJUDICATING A
JUVENILE DELIQUENT FOR DISORDERLY CONDUCT
IN RE H.K.
In In re H.K.,122 H.K. appealed from an order finding her a delinquent
child, contending the juvenile court erred by rejecting her motion to dismiss, allowing evidence beyond the scope of the allegations in the petition,
and finding she committed disorderly conduct.123 The North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed.124
The State filed a petition alleging H.K. committed the delinquent act of
disorderly conduct on or about February 27, 2009.125 The petition stemmed
from an incident at a teen center in Valley City, North Dakota, during
which H.K. followed T.L., a teenage girl of African-American ancestry,
into a bathroom, called T.L. a “nigger,” and threatened her.126 At a hearing
on the matter, T.L. testified about the teen center events, an incident at a
restaurant the same evening where more name-calling occurred, and an
obscene gesture that H.K. made several weeks later.127 During the hearing,
H.K. argued the State was attempting to make use of the word “nigger” a
crime and was thereby violating her rights under the First Amendment, but
the juvenile court still found H.K. to be a delinquent child.128
On appeal, H.K. first argued the juvenile court should have dismissed
the petition because the State failed to allege facts that satisfied the definition of disorderly conduct.129 To bring a juvenile within the jurisdiction of
the court, a petition must provide facts alleging a delinquent act, such as a
crime.130 Those factual allegations must also be specific enough to satisfy
the adequate notice requirement of due process.131 The petition filed by the
State generally restated the definition of disorderly conduct with the addition of alleging H.K. called T.L. a “nigger.”132 The North Dakota Supreme
Court held the petition satisfactorily alleged specific facts to satisfy the
definition of disorderly conduct and provided H.K. with adequate notice of

122. 2010 ND 27, 778 N.W.2d 764.
123. H.K., 2010 ND 27, ¶ 1, 778 N.W.2d at 764.
124. Id.
125. Id. ¶¶ 2, 7, 778 N.W.2d at 766, 768.
126. Id. ¶¶ 3, 7, 778 N.W.2d at 766-68.
127. Id. ¶ 3, 778 N.W.2d at 766-67. H.K. objected to the testimony relating to the gesture,
arguing it was beyond the scope of the petition. Id.
128. Id. ¶ 4, 778 N.W.2d at 767.
129. Id. ¶ 6.
130. Id. ¶ 8, 778 N.W.2d at 768.
131. Id. ¶ 9.
132. Id. ¶ 7.
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the charges against her because the petition described H.K.’s conduct at the
teen center.133
H.K. argued further the juvenile court erred by denying her motion to
dismiss because freedom of speech prohibited consideration of the statements H.K. made when she called T.L. a “nigger,” and, therefore, there was
no foundation for the disorderly conduct charge.134 Under North Dakota
law, a person may not be charged with disorderly conduct based upon a
constitutionally protected activity.135 While the First Amendment forbids
the government from barring speech based upon the speech’s content, fighting words that are likely to incite a breach of the peace are not protected by
freedom of speech.136 The context in which an expression was used is
examined to determine if the particular phrases are fighting words.137 The
North Dakota Supreme Court held H.K.’s statements were fighting words
because H.K. did more than simply yell racial slurs at T.L.138 The context
in which the statements were made, as well as the threatening nature of her
words, were likely to incite a breach of the peace or provoke a violent
reaction.139 Consequently, the statements were properly considered by the
juvenile court as evidence of disorderly conduct.140
H.K. next argued the juvenile court erred when it considered evidence
beyond the scope of the petition.141 During the hearing, the juvenile court
allowed testimony from T.L. about events that took place at a restaurant
after she left the teen center and about events that occurred weeks later.142
H.K. objected to the admission of testimony concerning the latter but failed
to object to the testimony about events at the restaurant.143 An issue not
raised during the hearing may not be considered on appeal unless the issue
is an obvious error affecting a substantial right.144 The North Dakota
Supreme Court held the admission of the testimony did not affect H.K.’s
substantial rights because it was not essential to the juvenile court’s finding
that H.K. committed the crime.145 Although testimony regarding events
133. Id. ¶¶ 9-10, 778 N.W.2d at 768-69.
134. Id. ¶ 11, 778 N.W.2d at 769.
135. Id. ¶ 12. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01(2) (2009) (stating “[t]his section does
not apply to constitutionally protected activity”).
136. H.K., ¶ 13, 778 N.W.2d at 770.
137. Id.
138. Id. ¶ 14.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. ¶ 15.
142. Id.
143. Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 778 N.W.2d at 771.
144. Id. ¶ 16.
145. Id.

2010]

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

451

weeks after the teen center testimony was admitted in error over H.K.’s
objection, the North Dakota Supreme Court held the admission did not induce the juvenile court to base its finding on incompetent evidence because
the finding could have been based entirely on the events at the teen
center.146
Finally, H.K. argued the juvenile court’s finding that H.K. performed
actions that satisfied the definition of disorderly conduct was clearly erroneous.147 After reiterating H.K.’s conduct at the teen center, the North
Dakota Supreme Court held the juvenile court’s finding that H.K. committed disorderly conduct was not clearly erroneous.148 Having rejected all
of H.K.’s contentions of error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed
the juvenile court’s order.149

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. ¶¶ 17-18.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶¶ 20-21, 778 N.W.2d at 772.
Id. ¶ 22.
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CRIMINAL LAW—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—EVIDENCE
STATE V. STRIDIRON
In State v. Stridiron,150 Antonio Phillip Stridiron appealed from criminal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of felony murder.151
Bradley A. Davis appealed from a criminal judgment entered on a jury
verdict finding him guilty of aggravated assault.152 The North Dakota
Supreme Court consolidated the appeals and affirmed the criminal judgments, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its pre-trial
rulings and concluding sufficient evidence existed to support the convictions.153
On July 29, 2007, Joshua Velasquez was found dead in Minot, North
Dakota.154 His body was discovered in an alley, across the street from a
duplex where he had attended a party the night before.155 Stridiron and
Davis were living in the duplex at the time of the murder.156 After police
conducted an investigation, the State charged Stridiron with felony murder
and Davis with aggravated assault.157 The State asserted Stridiron shot
Velasquez with a handgun after Davis struck Velasquez with “a garden tool
containing serrated blades.”158 The district court consolidated the cases for
trial.159 The jury returned guilty verdicts.160
On appeal, Davis argued the district court erred in granting the State’s
pre-trial motion to join the cases for trial over Davis’s objection and in
failing to sever the cases when Davis renewed his objection during voir
dire.161 The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed, concluding the district
court did not err in joining the cases for trial and refusing to grant Davis’s
request for severance during voir dire.162 The court explained under Rule
13 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court has the
authority to “order two or more indictments, informations, or complaints to
be tried together if the offenses and the defendants, if there is more than

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

2010 ND 19, 777 N.W.2d 892.
Stridiron, ¶ 1, 777 N.W.2d at 895.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id.
Id., 777 N.W.2d at 896.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 9, 777 N.W.2d at 897.
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one, could have been joined in a single indictment, information, or complaint.”163 The court further explained joinder is proper when multiple
defendants participated jointly in an act.164 But even when joinder is proper
before trial, the court noted, severance of the cases may still be necessary at
a later point if the district court determines substantial prejudice exists to
one of the defendants as a result of the previously granted joinder.165
Accordingly, under Rule 14 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a district court has a continuing duty to monitor whether the
joinder causes substantial prejudice and to order severance in cases where
justice so requires.166
The State charged Stridiron and Davis with participating in the murder
of Joshua Velasquez.167 On appeal, Davis conceded the joinder allowed for
judicial economy, but argued he was prejudiced because: a newspaper
article stated Davis and Stridiron’s trial was for the murder of Joshua
Velasquez; evidence introduced at trial was relevant to Stridiron’s murder
charge, but not Davis’s assault charge; and Stridiron’s attorney attempted to
implicate Davis in the murder of Velasquez.168 The North Dakota Supreme
Court, however, rejected Davis’s arguments, holding Davis failed to demonstrate any prejudice to the jury resulting from the newspaper article.169 In
addition, the court stated “[b]are allegations that a defendant would stand a
better chance of acquittal in a separate trial . . . [are] insufficient to compel
severance.”170 Finally, the court reiterated its prior holding that “an attempt
by one defendant to exculpate himself by inculpating another defendant is
insufficient ground to require separate trials.”171 Therefore, the North
Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in granting
the State’s pre-trial motion for joinder and in declining to grant Davis’s
request for severance during voir dire.172
Stridiron also argued on appeal the district court erred in denying his
pre-trial motions to pool the jury for bias through a public opinion survey
and to change the trial venue on the ground of prejudicial pre-trial publicity.173 The supreme court explained Rule 21(a) of the North Dakota Rules
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. ¶ 6, 777 N.W.2d at 896 (quoting N.D. R. CRIM. P. 13).
Id. (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. 8 explanatory note).
Id. (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. 14).
Id., 777 N.W.2d at 897 (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. 14).
Id. ¶ 7.
Id.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id. (quoting State v. Wamre, 1999 ND 164, ¶ 30, 599 N.W.2d 268, 279).
Id.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 10, 777 N.W.2d at 897-98.
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of Criminal Procedure requires a district court, upon a defendant’s motion,
to “transfer the proceeding against the defendant to another county if the
court is satisfied that so great a prejudice against the defendants exists in the
transferring county that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial
there.”174 However, the court noted publicity alone is not sufficient to
establish prejudice and stated a criminal defendant bears the burden of
showing the publicity did in fact prejudice him.175 The court added “[t]he
quantity of media coverage does not control a motion for change of venue.”176 What controls, the court explained, is the prejudicial effect of such
coverage upon the defendant’s ability to obtain a fair and impartial trial.177
The supreme court rejected Stridiron’s arguments that the district court
erred in denying his pre-trial motions.178 The court explained the district
court conducted its own extensive questioning of the jury to assess the
jury’s knowledge of the case and determine any possible bias.179 Moreover,
each juror was questioned both by the court and by the parties.180 Because
the district court was in a better position to listen to the jury’s responses and
draw any inferences from them, and because the district court was better
able to ascertain the prejudicial effect of any pre-trial media publicity, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Stridiron’s pre-trial
motions to pool the jury and to change the trial venue.181
Furthermore, both Stridiron and Davis argued the State’s use of a
peremptory challenge to excuse the only African-American individual from
the jury was racially motivated and asserted the district court was clearly
erroneous in ruling it was not.182 In addressing the appellants’ argument,
the North Dakota Supreme Court first noted the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits the prosecution from using a peremptory challenge when the only
basis for the challenge is race.183 The court then explained when a defendant challenges the use of a peremptory challenge, the defendant must
show: (1) he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the peremptory challenge was used to excuse another member of defendant’s group;
(2) he is entitled to rely on the fact peremptory challenges “constitute a jury
174. Id. ¶ 11, 777 N.W.2d at 898 (quoting N.D. R. CRIM. P. 21(a)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. ¶ 14, 777 N.W.2d at 899.
179. Id. ¶ 12, 777 N.W.2d at 898.
180. Id.
181. Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 777 N.W.2d at 898-99 (quoting State v. Austin, 520 N.W.2d 564, 568
(N.D.1994)).
182. Id. ¶ 15, 777 N.W.2d at 899. Both Davis and Stridiron are African-American. Id. ¶ 2,
777 N.W.2d at 895.
183. Id. ¶ 16, 777 N.W.2d at 899 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986)).
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selection practice that permits ‘those to discriminate who are of a mind to
discriminate[;]’” and (3) the relevant circumstances raise an inference of
purposeful discrimination on the part of the prosecution.184 If the defendant
meets all three requirements, then the burden shifts to the prosecution to
give a clear and reasonably specific race-neutral explanation for the use of
the peremptory challenge in question.185 The court concluded the State
successfully met its burden in the case at hand.186 The State’s explanation
that the juror was excused because she had served as a juror in an earlier
homicide case, which the prosecutor had tried, was reading a book while
the judge was talking to the jury members and had unsatisfactory responses
to the questions related to self-defense. This overcame the prima facie evidence of racial motivation in the use of the peremptory challenge.187
Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the district court’s ruling that the
exclusion of the only African-American from the jury pool “was not based
on race.”188
Next, Stridiron argued the district court erred in denying his request to
introduce testimony from a witness stating Davis had confessed to the murder.189 Stridiron contended the testimony was admissible under the statement against interest exception of Rule 804(b)(3) of the North Dakota Rules
of Evidence.190 The North Dakota Supreme Court explained Rule 804(3)(b)
has three requirements.191 First, the party seeking to invoke the exception
must show the declarant is unavailable.192 Second, the statement must be of
such nature as to expose the declarant to criminal liability at the time he
made the statement.193 Finally, the statement must be corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness.194 In denying Stridiron’s
motion, the district court found the proposed testimony failed the trustworthiness requirement of Rule 804(3)(b).195 On appeal, Stridiron asserted
the district court should have focused on the trustworthiness of Davis’s
“confession,” not the trustworthiness of the witness’s proposed
testimony.196
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98).
Id. ¶ 17, 777 N.W.2d at 900.
Id.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 20.
Id. ¶ 21.
Id.
Id.
Id., 777 N.W.2d at 901.
Id. ¶ 22.
Id.
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Recognizing the issue raised by Stridiron was one of first impression
for the court, the North Dakota Supreme Court first discussed the split in
jurisdictions that have previously addressed Stridiron’s argument.197 The
court ultimately agreed “with the courts which allow a district court to
analyze the veracity of the in-court witness because those decisions are
better reasoned and give effect to the intention of the drafters of Fed. R. Ev.
804(b)(3).”198 Accordingly, the court adopted the rule that a district court
determining the “corroborating circumstances” under Rule 804(b)(3) must
analyze “both the credibility of the in-court witness and the reliability of the
out-of-court declarant.”199 To assist district courts in applying the newly
adopted rule, the North Dakota Supreme Court provided several nonexclusive factors district courts may consider in determining “the veracity
of the in-court witness and the reliability of the out-of-court declarant.”200
The factors include an inquiry into the declarant’s motive to misrepresent
the matter, the general character of the in-court witness, the spontaneity of
the statement, and the relationship between the declarant and the witness.201
Here, the district court found the proposed in-court witness had a
motive to misrepresent the matter because she was the best friend of
Stridiron’s girlfriend.202 Furthermore, the district court analyzed the veracity of Davis’s alleged confession and determined the evidence was insufficient to make the “confession” trustworthy.203 Because the Supreme
Court concluded the district court properly applied the factors for analyzing
corroborating circumstances under Rule 804(3)(b), the court affirmed the
district court’s ruling that the proffered testimony was inadmissible.204
Finally, Davis argued insufficient evidence existed to support his conviction for aggravated assault.205 Davis’s argument was largely based on
the jury’s unwillingness to accept his self-defense assertion at trial.206 The
North Dakota Supreme Court explained when a defendant brings a sufficiency of the evidence challenge on appeal, the court “does not sit as a
thirteenth juror to make independent determinations of credibility of

197. Id. ¶ 23.
198. Id. ¶ 24, 777 N.W.2d at 902.
199. Id.
200. Id. ¶ 25.
201. Id., 777 N.W.2d at 902-03 (quoting United States v. Rasmussen, 790 F.2d 55, 56 (8th
Cir. 1986)).
202. Id. ¶ 26, 777 N.W.2d at 903.
203. Id.
204. Id. ¶ 27.
205. Id. ¶ 28.
206. Id. ¶ 31.
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witnesses or other evidentiary weight.”207 The court stated a number of
witnesses testified to seeing Davis strike Velasquez with the garden tool.208
Thus, the court determined sufficient evidence existed to support the
conviction and affirm the jury verdict of guilty.209

207. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
208. Id.
209. Id.

458

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:437

CRIMINAL LAW—SEXUAL OFFENSES—EVIDENCE
STATE V. PAUL
In State v. Paul,210 Wilson Grant Paul, Sr. appealed from a jury verdict
finding him guilty of gross sexual imposition.211 The North Dakota
Supreme Court, concluding the district court did not commit a reversible
error during the evidentiary hearing, affirmed the judgment because the
evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict.212
In August 2007, L.L., Paul’s girlfriend’s nine-year-old niece, who was
then living in Oklahoma with her older sister, V.L., and the mother of
Paul’s girlfriend, S.L., told V.L. and S.L. that Paul had touched her inappropriately while she was visiting Paul and his girlfriend a month earlier.213
S.L. reported her conversation with L.L. to the Oklahoma Department of
Health and Human Services.214 A social worker subsequently conducted an
interview with L.L., which the social worker videotaped.215 As a result of
the interview and following further investigation by the authorities, Paul
was charged with gross sexual imposition.216 Specifically, the basis for the
charge was L.L.’s statement that Paul made her “touch his penis with her
hand.”217
The district court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of L.L.’s out-of-court statements to V.L., S.L., and the social
worker.218 The district court found the statements were admissible.219 At
trial, the district court allowed the jury to both view L.L.’s videotaped interview and to hear V.L.’s and S.L.’s testimony about L.L.’s allegations of
sexual abuse.220 The court further allowed the State to present expert
testimony regarding the time it takes children to report sexual abuse and
their presentation when making such reports.221 L.L. testified on three
separate occasions during trial.222 In her first two testimonies, she denied
remembering any sexual abuse.223 On the third time, however, she stated
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

2009 ND 120, 769 N.W.2d 416.
Paul, ¶ 1, 769 N.W.2d at 418.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 2-3.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4, 769 N.W.2d at 419.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2010]

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

459

Paul had made improper sexual advances toward her while she was in his
apartment.224 Paul denied L.L.’s allegations and called his girlfriend to testify in his defense.225 At the end of trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict.226 Paul was subsequently sentenced to twenty-five years in prison,
seven of which were suspended.227
On appeal, Paul argued the district court erred in allowing the State to
introduce expert testimony on the delayed reporting of sexual abuse by children and on children’s presentation regarding such reports.228 The North
Dakota Supreme Court analyzed Paul’s argument by stating under Rule 702
of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, “[A] witness who qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise,” as long as his or her testimony would assist the jury in understanding the evidence.229 The court
noted the decision to admit expert testimony is within the discretion of the
district court and will not be overturned on appeal unless the district court
acted “in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner.”230
Because the State’s expert witness was a counselor from the Rape and
Abuse Crisis Center who had a master’s degree in clinical education and
had worked with more than one hundred sexually abused children, the
North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its
discretion in ruling the witness could testify as an expert on the narrow
issue of delay in reporting sexual abuse by children.231
Next, Paul challenged the district court’s admission of L.L.’s out-ofcourt statements, including L.L.’s statements to V.L., S.L., and the social
worker.232 Paul first challenged the admission of the statement on grounds
of insufficient guarantees of trustworthiness and reliability, as required by
Rule 803(24) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence.233 However, because
Paul only objected to the admission of the evidence pre-trial and failed to
do so at trial, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated it would review the
admission of L.L.’s out-of-court statements only for “obvious error

224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. ¶ 5.
229. Id. ¶ 6 (quoting N.D. R. EVID. 702).
230. Id. (citing State v. Schmidkunz, 2006 ND 192, ¶ 15, 721 N.W.2d 387, 393).
231. Id. ¶¶ 7-8, 769 N.W.2d at 419-20.
232. Id. ¶ 9, 769 N.W.2d at 420.
233. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. Rule 803(24) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence supplies a hearsay
exception for a child’s out-of-court statement regarding sexual abuse. Id. ¶ 12.
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affecting substantial rights.”234 The court then explained Rule 803(24)
requires a district court to consider and make explicit findings on the
following non-exclusive factors of trustworthiness: “(1) ‘spontaneity and
consistent repetition’ of the statements, (2) ‘the mental state of the declarant,’ (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age,’ and (4) ‘a
lack of motive to fabricate.’”235 A district court’s ruling to admit certain
evidence is discretionary, the court noted, and will not be disturbed unless
“the ruling was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.”236 The North Dakota
Supreme Court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling
L.L.’s out-of-court statements were admissible because the district court
carefully considered and thoroughly analyzed each of these factors.237 In
particular, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did
not commit an obvious error because the district court found all four factors
for trustworthiness were met: (1) L.L. repeated her allegation of sexual
abuse numerous times to her sister, V.L., and spontaneously told S.L. and
the social worker about the abuse when asked what happened; (2) L.L. was
emotional when talking about the alleged abuse, as evidenced by her
crying; (3) the terminology L.L. used was appropriate for a child of similar
age; and (4) no evidence showed L.L. had a motive to fabricate the sexual
abuse allegations.238
Paul further argued L.L.’s out-of-court statements implicated him in
“other crimes” and the admission of these “other crimes” constituted a reversible error under Rule 404(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence.239
The “other crimes” Paul referred to involved prior sexual contact between
Paul and L.L.240 Both V.L. and S.L. testified L.L. had informed them Paul
had sexually abused her on several occasions prior to the July 2007 incident.241 Paul argued the district court abused its discretion by allowing
V.L. and S.L. to testify to those “other [uncharged] crimes.”242
In addressing Paul’s 404(b) argument, the North Dakota Supreme
Court explained, “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”243 The court clarified, however, evidence of other crimes is
234.
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Id. ¶ 11 (citing State v. Wegley, 2008 ND 4, ¶ 13, 744 N.W.2d 284, 291).
Id. ¶ 12 (quoting State v. Muhle, 2007 ND 131, ¶ 12, 737 N.W.2d 636, 640).
Id., 769 N.W.2d at 421 (citing Wegley, 2008 ND 4, ¶ 12, 744 N.W.2d at 290-91).
Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 769 N.W.2d at 421-22.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶¶ 9, 15, 769 N.W.2d at 420, 422.
See id. ¶ 15, 769 N.W.2d at 422.
Id. ¶ 16.
See id. ¶¶ 15-16.
Id. ¶ 17 (quoting N.D. R. EVID. 404(b)).
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admissible to show “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”244 The court stated district courts must consider three factors in determining the admissibility of
other crimes evidence.245 First, district courts must consider the purpose for
which the evidence of other crimes is being offered.246 Next, district courts
must determine whether the evidence of prior acts is substantially reliable.247 Moreover, if evidence of other crimes is offered in a criminal case,
proof of the crime charged must exist as to allow the jury to “establish the
defendant’s guilt or innocence independently on the evidence presented,
without consideration of the evidence of prior acts.”248 Finally, under Rule
403 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, district courts must consider
whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect.249
After reviewing the district court’s findings, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence of Paul’s prior acts of sexual abuse against L.L.250 The court reasoned the lapse of time—fourteen months—between Paul’s prior acts of
sexual abuse and the July 2007 incident did not render Paul’s prior acts
“wholly independent crimes.”251 The court explained because Paul did not
have access to L.L. during the lapse and because “the prior acts and charged
crime involved the same victim,” Paul’s prior acts of sexual abuse were not
evidence of “wholly independent crimes,” but rather constituted “evidence
of activity in furtherance of the same criminal activity.”252 The district
court’s ruling to admit evidence of Paul’s prior sexual abuse against L.L.
was not, therefore, a reversible error.253
Finally, Paul argued the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty
verdict.254 The North Dakota Supreme Court stated appellate review of sufficiency of the evidence is rather limited because the court considers only
the evidence “most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences
244. Id. (quoting N.D.R. EVID. 404(b)).
245. Id. ¶ 18.
246. Id. (citing State v. Alvarado, 2008 ND 203, ¶ 14, 757 N.W.2d 570, 577).
247. Id. (citing Alvarado, ¶ 14).
248. Id. (citing Alvarado, ¶ 14).
249. Id. (citing Alvarado, ¶ 19).
250. Id. ¶ 28, 769 N.W.2d at 426.
251. Id. ¶¶ 23-25, 769 N.W.2d at 424-25 (citing State v. Thomson, 533 S.E.2d 834, 839
(N.C. Ct. App. 2000)) (“When there is a period of time during which there is no evidence of
sexual abuse, the lapse does not require exclusion of the evidence if the defendant did not have
access to the victim . . . during the lapse.”).
252. Id. ¶¶ 24-25 (citing Alvarado, ¶ 12, 757 N.W.2d at 576).
253. Id. ¶ 28, 769 N.W.2d at 426.
254. Id. ¶ 29.
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therefrom to see if there is substantial evidence to warrant a conviction.”255
The court will reverse a conviction only if “no rational fact finder could
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”256 Viewing
the evidence in light most favorable to the prosecution, the North Dakota
Supreme Court held L.L.’s testimony that Paul made her “touch his penis
with her hand” was sufficient to establish sexual contact and sustain the
conviction of gross sexual imposition.257

255. Id. ¶ 30.
256. Id.
257. Id. ¶ 31 (citing State v. Morstad, 493 N.W.2d 645, 646 (N.D. 1992) (explaining the
uncorroborated testimony of a child is sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict for a sexual offense)).
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FAMILY LAW—CHILD CUSTODY—BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD FACTORS
FRUEH V. FRUEH
In Frueh v. Frueh,258 Darin Frueh appealed a district court order
denying his motion for a change of custody.259 The North Dakota Supreme
Court held the district court relied on impermissible factors in considering
whether a change of custody was in the best interest of the child.260 The
court explained Darin Frueh’s child support payment amount, which was
set by the district court, should not have been considered a relevant
factor.261 The court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the
case.262
Darin Frueh (Frueh) and Malissa Frueh Hoheisel (Hoheisel) were
married in 1992 and had one child in 1994.263 The couple divorced in January 2004.264 During the divorce, the parties stipulated Hoheisel would take
physical custody of the child and Frueh would have visitation rights.265 The
stipulation was incorporated into the final divorce judgment.266 When
Frueh’s child support obligation was initially set, he was a self-employed
farmer of 3300 acres.267 Frueh’s average income over the five-year period
prior to the divorce was below the minimum wage. Accordingly, in July
2004, the district court set Frueh’s child support payment at the “minimum
wage” amount of $168 per month.268 The amount of child support had not
been reviewed since July 2004.269
In July 2007, Frueh made the motion to modify the custody arrangement.270 Frueh argued several events amounted to a material change in
circumstances, including Hoheisel’s move from Goodrich to Bismarck,
Hoheisel’s remarriage, the child’s desire to live with Frueh, and allegations
that Hoheisel’s husband physically assaulted the child.271 In support of
Frueh’s motion, the child signed an affidavit that explained why the child
258.
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wanted to live with Frueh and alleged that Hoheisel’s husband grabbed the
child by the throat in 2006.272 The district court concluded Frueh’s allegations did not amount to a material change and denied Frueh an evidentiary
hearing.273 On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court held Frueh established a prima facie case by showing there was a material change in circumstances.274 The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded
for an evidentiary hearing on Frueh’s motion.275
On remand and after an evidentiary hearing, the district court again
denied Frueh’s motion to modify custody.276 At the hearing in August
2008, several witnesses testified.277 Although the district court found there
was a material change in circumstances, the court concluded a change in
custody was not in the best interest of the child.278 The district court considered the child’s interest in living with Frueh, but discounted the child’s
preference because it determined he was not mature.279 Also, the district
court discussed Frueh’s child support payment.280 The district court noted
Frueh currently had a large farming operation and gave expensive gifts to
the child, yet his child support obligation was still based upon the “minimum wage” amount.281 The district court commented Frueh attempted to
buy the affections of the child and because Hoheisel did not have the financial resources to compete, the factor favored Hoheisel.282
On appeal, Frueh argued the district court erred when it denied his
motion for a change of custody.283 Frueh contended: (1) the district court
improperly based its decision on its opinion that Frueh was not paying
sufficient child support, and (2) its finding that the child was not a mature
child for purposes of expressing a preference was clearly erroneous.284 The
North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Frueh and held the district court
misapplied the law when it considered the amount of Frueh’s child support
obligation.285 The court explained a district court may modify a prior
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Id., 771 N.W.2d at 596.
Id. (citing Frueh v. Frueh, 2008 ND 26, 745 N.W.2d 362).
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Id. ¶ 4.
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custody order after two years from the time since an order establishing
custody was entered if the court finds:
On the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior order or which
were unknown to the court at the time of the prior order, a material
change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the parties; and the modification is necessary to serve the best interest of
the child.286
The court noted the district court must consider whether a change in
custody is necessary to serve the best interests of the child if it finds there
has been a material change in circumstances.287 As the proponent of the
custody modification, Frueh had the burden of proving both that there had
been a material change in circumstances and that a change in custody was
necessary to serve the child’s best interests.288 In determining whether the
child’s best interest would be served by a modification, the court must
apply the factors set out by statute.289 The court explained a district court’s
decision to modify custody is a finding of fact and will not be reversed unless it was clearly erroneous.290
The North Dakota Supreme Court held the district court clearly erred
when it impermissibly considered Frueh’s child support obligation.291 The
court explained child support payments are presumed to be correct when set
using the child support guidelines. In this case, Frueh’s support obligation
was based upon the guidelines in July 2004 and, therefore, should have
been presumed to be the correct amount of support.292 Further, there was
no evidence that Frueh ever was late or missed a child support payment.293
The court held the district court misapplied the law when it improperly considered Frueh’s child support payment insufficient, despite the presumed
correctness of the payment.294
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined Frueh failed to meet his
burden of proving the district court clearly erred when it discounted the
child’s preference to live with Frueh.295 The court explained a child’s

286. Id. ¶ 8 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.6(6) (2009)).
287. Id. ¶ 10.
288. Id.
289. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)).
290. Id. ¶ 7.
291. Id. ¶ 13, 771 N.W.2d at 598-99.
292. Id. at 598; see N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-09 (2009) (stating child support that is
calculated using the child support guidelines is presumptively correct).
293. Id. ¶ 13, 771 N.W.2d at 598.
294. Id., 771 N.W.2d at 598-99.
295. Id. ¶ 14, 771 N.W.2d at 599.
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preference is given more weight as children mature.296 The district court
found the child was not mature and his preference was not a factor in deciding custody.297 The North Dakota Supreme Court held the district court’s
determination was supported by the evidence and was not clearly erroneous.298 Thus, there was no clear error on this factor, but the court reversed
the district court’s order denying Frueh’s motion for a change in custody—
because the district court clearly erred when it considered the amount of
Frueh’s child support—and remanded the case to properly consider the best
interest factors.299
Justice Maring filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.300 Justice
Maring concurred with the majority in its finding of no reversible error, but
dissented from the majority reversing the case.301 Justice Maring explained
the trial court did not deny the motion to modify custody because it
concluded Frueh paid too little child support, but rather that Frueh’s
credibility was called into question because Frueh gave his child extravagant gifts and money while he made child support payments based on the
“minimum wage” amount.302 Justice Maring stated the district court’s
order denying Frueh’s motion to modify custody was supported by the
evidence, and the district court did not misapply the law or consider
improper evidence.303

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id. (citing Dronen v. Dronen, 2009 ND 70, ¶ 14, 764 N.W.2d 675, 684).
Id. ¶ 15.
Id.
Id. ¶ 17, 771 N.W.2d at 600.
Id. ¶ 23, 771 N.W.2d at 601.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 27-28, 771 N.W.2d at 602.
Id. ¶ 35, 771 N.W.2d at 604.
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HOUSING DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR V. MATRIX PROPERTIES
In Department of Labor v. Matrix Properties,304 the State, through the
Department of Labor (Department), appealed from a summary judgment
dismissing its discriminatory housing practice action on the ground the
action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.305 The State
contended the district court erred when it ruled the civil action was barred
by the two-year statute of limitations in 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) and
section 14-02.5-39(1) of the North Dakota Century Code.306 The North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.307
Evert Johnson, who is disabled and uses a wheelchair, issued a complaint to the Department in December 2005.308 Johnson alleged Matrix
Properties Corporation, formerly known as E.W. Wylie Corporation, Wild
& Associates, Ltd., and Ulteig Engineers, Inc. (collectively, Matrix),
committed discriminatory acts by failing to comply with the design and
construction requirements under federal and state law for the Stonebridge
Apartments in Fargo.309 The apartment building Johnson lived in received
its certificate of occupancy from the city in 1998.310 After an investigation,
the Department issued a determination of reasonable cause and a charge of
discrimination against Matrix in January 2007, and Matrix elected to have
the claims decided in district court.311
Matrix moved for summary judgment dismissal of the action, claiming
it was barred by the two-year statute of limitations under the federal Fair
Housing Act (FHA) and the state Housing Discrimination Act.312 The district court determined the statute of limitations required any action concerning the design and construction of the apartment building must be brought
within two years from the issuance of the certificate of occupancy in
1998.313 Because the civil action was not brought until 2005, the court dismissed the action as time barred.314 An alternative claim that Matrix had
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

2009 ND 137, 770 N.W.2d 290.
Matrix Properties, ¶ 1, 770 N.W.2d at 291-92.
Id. ¶ 4, 770 N.W.2d at 292.
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶¶ 1-2.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
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engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination was also dismissed without prejudice because the State had failed to first make an administrative
determination of reasonable cause.315
The court began its analysis by outlining the standard of review, stating
the determination of when a cause of action accrues is generally a question
of fact, but if there is no dispute about the relevant facts, the determination
is a question of law for the court.316 The court next examined the legislature’s goals in adopting North Dakota’s Housing Discrimination Act,
chapter 14-02.5 of the North Dakota Century Code, in 1999.317 The first
goal was to establish “a regulatory authority and administrative process for
receiving and investigating charges of housing discrimination under state
law.”318 Next, the Housing Discrimination Act “provides for state enforcement of federal fair housing law, provided that its provisions are ‘substantially equivalent’ to . . . those in the Federal Fair Housing Act.”319 The
“substantial equivalency” component was important to ensure the state
agency could be “eligible to receive federal funds from HUD [Department
of Housing and Urban Development] to investigate charges of housing
discrimination filed under federal law.”320 The State contended North
Dakota’s Housing Discrimination Act had been certified by the Secretary of
HUD as being substantially equivalent to the rights, procedures, and remedies created under the federal FHA.321 “Discrimination” is defined to include a failure to “design and construct” covered multifamily dwellings that
comport with certain accessibility requirements for handicapped persons.322
A civil action to enforce the design and construction requirements may
be brought by an aggrieved person and “not later than the second year after
the date of the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory
housing practice.”323 The State argued the two-year limitation period began
to run only when Johnson discovered the design and construction flaws in
the Stonebridge Apartments, and the lawsuit was, therefore, brought in a
timely manner, while the defendants argued the two-year limitation period
315. Id.
316. Id. ¶ 5, 770 N.W.2d at 293.
317. Id. ¶ 6.
318. Id. (quoting Hearing on HB 1043 Before House Judiciary Comm., 56th N.D. Legis.
Sess. (Jan. 12, 1999) (written testimony of Mark Bachmeier, Interim Department of Labor
Commissioner)).
319. Id.
320. Id. (quoting Hearing on HB 1043 Before S. Appropriations Comm., 56th N.D. Legis.
Sess. (March 25, 1999) (written testimony of Mark Bachmeier, Interim Department of Labor
Commissioner)).
321. Id.
322. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C) (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-06(3)(c) (2009).
323. Id. ¶ 7 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-39(1)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A).
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began to run in 1998, when Fargo issued the certificate of occupancy.324
The district court agreed with the defendant’s interpretation and concluded
because the lawsuit was not brought until 2005, it was time barred.325
The North Dakota Supreme Court stated the interpretation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 3613(a)(1)(A) and section 14-02.5-39(1) of the North Dakota Century
Code presented a question of law.326 The first rule of statutory construction
is to determine the intent of the legislature by first looking at the language
of the statute.327 The operative language in 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) and
section 14-02.5-39(1) of the North Dakota Century Code is identical, with
both stating a civil action must be commenced not later than two years after
the “occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing
practice.”328 The issue of when the statute of limitations begins to run in a
design and construction case brought under the FHA was a question of first
impression in North Dakota.329
The North Dakota Supreme Court found the Virginia decision Moseke
v. Miller and Smith, Inc.330 instructive, which examined when the statute of
limitations would be triggered.331 The Moseke court focused on the “occurrence rule,” which it observed “ties the running of the limitations period to
the occurrence of the act or omission causing the injury,” rather than when
the plaintiff discovered the injury.332 The State argued the statute of
limitation period did not begin to run until units in the challenged housing
development became available to persons with disabilities, and so long as
the units did not conform to those requirements, there was an ongoing
discriminatory practice.333 The State supported its continuing violation
argument by citing to Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,334 and analogizing
design and construction cases to race discrimination cases under the
FHA.335
Several courts have refused to apply the continuous violation doctrine
to design and construction cases under the FHA, including Garcia v.
Brockway,336 in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the statute
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id., 770 N.W.2d at 294.
Id. ¶ 9 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-39(1)).
Id.
202 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Va. 2002).
Matrix Properties, ¶ 10, 770 N.W.2d at 294.
Id. (quoting Moseke, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 503).
Id. ¶ 11, 770 N.W.2d at 295.
455 U.S. 363 (1982).
Matrix Properties, ¶ 11.
526 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2008).
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of limitations in a design and construction case under the FHA is “triggered
at the conclusion of the design-and-construction phase, which occurs on the
date the last certificate of occupancy is issued.”337 Despite a split of authority on the issue, the North Dakota Supreme Court followed the holding in
Garcia because its reasoning was persuasive and it was the only federal
circuit court of appeals decision to directly address the specific issue.338
The State argued the court should not follow Garcia because the words
used by the North Dakota Legislature in enacting chapter 14-02.5 of the
North Dakota Century Code showed the legislature did not intend for the
statute of limitations triggering date to be at the completion of the construction of a dwelling.339 However, the court stated the legislative history did
not shed light on when the statute of limitations was triggered and was
instead concerned the state law be “substantially equivalent” to federal
law.340 In the context of a design and construction case, it is the completion
of the construction, rather than the mere existence of a noncompliant building, which constitutes the act that triggers the limitation period.341
Because the State did not raise on appeal the concern that the district
court’s decision converts the statute of limitations into a statute of repose,
amici curiae were prohibited from raising the issue and were “limited to
issues raised on appeal by the parties.”342 Hanson v. Williams County343
held a products liability statute of repose violated the equal protection provision of the North Dakota Constitution.344 However, the court noted even
if section 14-02.5-39(1) of the North Dakota Century Code was a statute of
repose, statutes of repose are not invariably unconstitutional.345
The State further contended the FHA and the Housing Discrimination
Act should be liberally construed.346 However, the court will “not ignore
the clear language of a statute under the guise of liberal construction.”347
The policy-making bodies of government make the decision of whether
public policy would be better served by extending the limitation period.348
Thus, the court concluded the two-year statute of limitations was triggered
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
368-69).
348.

Matrix Properties, ¶ 13.
Id., 770 N.W.2d at 296.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id., 770 N.W.2d at 297.
Id.
Id. ¶ 15 (quoting N.D. R. APP. P. 29(a)).
389 N.W.2d 319, 320 (N.D. 1986).
Matrix Properties, ¶ 15.
Id.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. (quoting Stein v. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2006 ND 34, ¶ 11, 710 N.W.2d 364,
Id. ¶ 16.
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when the building in which Johnson resided received its certificate of
occupancy in 1998, and the civil action time was barred because it was not
commenced until 2005.349 The district court’s summary judgment dismissal
was affirmed.350
Justice Kapsner dissented, joined by Justice Maring.351 The dissent
claimed if an owner of a building can survive two years after the construction without litigation, the owner can continue to reap the benefits of
noncompliant construction, and persons with disabilities are denied the
protections that were intended by federal and state statutes.352 Justice
Kapsner stated the majority followed an interpretation of the statutes that
denies the relief the housing statutes were designed to provide.353 The
dissent noted the certificate of occupancy does not have a relationship to the
requirements of the statutes, but instead shows only that the premises may
be occupied under the municipal codes.354 The majority and the Garcia
court viewed the certificate of occupancy as a starting point for the statute
of limitations.355 In applying this notion, the Garcia court relied on
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,356 which has since been superseded by statute as contrary to congressional intent in its analysis of the
statute of limitations.357
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009358 addressed pay discrimination and indicated pay discrimination was a continuing violation, allowing for a new claim to be filed each time a paycheck was issued.359 The Act
included the specific congressional finding that the “Ledbetter decision
undermine[d] those statutory protections by unduly restricting the time
period in which victims of discrimination [could] challenge and recover for
discriminatory compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the
intent of Congress.”360 Justice Kapsner found persuasive the rationale behind the Act that the United States Supreme Court erred in its analysis of
the statute of limitations.361 Because North Dakota’s housing statutes were
349. Id. ¶ 17, 770 N.W.2d at 297-98.
350. Id. ¶ 18, 770 N.W.2d at 298.
351. Id. ¶ 39, 770 N.W.2d at 304.
352. Id. ¶ 38, 770 N.W.2d at 303.
353. Id. ¶ 21, 770 N.W.2d at 298.
354. Id. ¶ 22.
355. Id.
356. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
357. Matrix Properties, ¶ 23.
358. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (Jan. 29, 2009).
359. Matrix Properties, ¶ 25, 770 N.W.2d at 299.
360. Id. ¶ 25 (quoting Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5
(Jan. 29, 2009)).
361. Id. ¶ 26.
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designed to mirror the federal statues, Justice Kapsner believed the clear
indication from Congress that the United States Supreme Court misinterpreted congressional intent on the limitations period to be applied in
Ledbetter should now inform decisions about the period of limitations,
instead of the flawed reasoning of Garcia, which incorporated the incorrect
reasoning of Ledbetter.362
Further, the Ledbetter decision did not correspond with the United
States Supreme Court’s prior interpretation of the Fair Housing Act in
Havens.363 Justice Kapsner believed the State’s position, that there can be a
continuing violation of the statute and that the period of limitations does not
run while the violation continues, was the appropriate position and supported by the language in both the state and federal statutes.364 Other courts
have held the ongoing offering for sale or lease of properties which are
noncompliant with the adaptive design requirements constituted a continuing violation under similar language in the federal statute.365 Justice
Kapsner also noted the owner/lessor is treated differently than the architects
and contractors who constructed the noncompliant building.366 Thus, the
result in Moseke could only apply to one defendant in this case.367
According to Justice Kapsner, the majority’s analysis was incorrect
when it separated a single subsection from the interpretation of the statute
as a whole.368 Subsection 3 is a definitional subsection of section 14-02.506 of the North Dakota Century Code that provides context to subsections 1
and 2.369 A violation of the general prohibition against discrimination is
contained in the overarching provisions of the statute, which is contained in
subsections 1 and 2.370 The dissent in Garcia echoed Kapsner’s position,
believing the statute of limitations begins when the individual first attempts
to buy, rent, or test the FHA-noncompliant unit.371 The Garcia dissent explained it was at that time that the person with the disability was discriminated against by the developer or landlord.372 A person that does not attempt to rent until more than two years after completion of the building has

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

Id. ¶ 27.
Id. ¶ 28.
Id.
Id. ¶ 29, 770 N.W.2d at 300.
Id. ¶ 30.
Id.
Id. ¶ 31, 770 N.W.2d at 301.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 32.
Id.
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no remedy under the majority’s interpretation.373 Justice Kapsner interpreted the statutes as declaring an owner, who continues to offer for rent or
sale a nonconforming unit, has not yet terminated a discriminatory housing
practice, and it is the termination of the discriminatory housing practice that
would start the period of limitations.374 Thus, because Johnson rented the
apartment in March 2005 and moved out of the apartment in October 2005,
Johnson’s claim would be timely.375
Finally, despite the majority not addressing the issue of a statute of
repose, Justice Kapsner explained discussion of the issue was necessary
because affirming the district court’s decision turned the statute of limitations into a statute of repose.376 “A statute of limitation bars a right of
action unless it is filed within a specified period of time after an injury
occurs.”377 “A statute of repose terminates any right of action after a
specific time has elapsed, regardless of whether or not there has as yet been
an injury.”378 While agreeing that statutes of repose are not always unconstitutional, the dissent reasoned that interpreting the statute of limitations as
a statute of repose is contrary to the plain language of the statutes.379 To
qualify as an aggrieved person under section 14-02.5-01(1) of the North
Dakota Century Code, a person has to have been injured or has to foresee a
future injury.380 The North Dakota Supreme Court has previously held the
termination of a statute of repose is not contingent on whether a person had
been injured.381 As a result, Justice Kapsner concluded the court’s precedent and the plain language of the statute contradict one another as a result
of the outcome of this case.382

373. Id., 770 N.W.2d at 302.
374. Id. ¶ 33.
375. Id. ¶ 34.
376. Id. ¶ 35.
377. Id. ¶ 36, 770 N.W.2d at 303 (quoting Hoffner v. Johnson, 2003 ND 79, ¶ 9, 660 N.W.2d
909, 913-14).
378. Id. (quoting Hoffner, ¶ 9).
379. Id. ¶ 37.
380. Id.
381. Id. (citing Hoffner, ¶ 9).
382. Id.
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JURISDICTION—N.D. SUPREME COURT—SUPERVISORY WRITS
STATE V. LEE
In State v. Lee,383 the State petitioned for a supervisory writ, asking the
North Dakota Supreme Court to recognize a district court’s jurisdiction
over a driving offense, which occurred within city limits.384 The supreme
court granted the State’s petition and held the district court had jurisdiction
over the driving offense.385
A highway patrol officer stopped a driver for speeding within the city
limits of Minot, North Dakota.386 The officer found the driver’s license had
been suspended and charged the driver with driving while under suspension.387 The officer issued a citation for the offense, which stated the case
would be heard in Ward County’s district court.388 However, although the
driver pleaded guilty to the offense, the district court refused to accept the
guilty plea.389 The district court explained because the offense occurred
within the city limits of Minot, the case should have been brought in city
court.390 Accordingly, the district court dismissed the charges against the
driver.391
The district court entered its written order dismissing the case against
the driver on May 9, 2009.392 The State subsequently filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the district court denied on July 13, 2009.393 On
July 20, 2009, the State filed a notice of appeal.394 The North Dakota
Supreme Court asked the State to address the timeliness of its appeal.395
The State conceded the appeal was untimely, but asked the supreme court to
exercise its supervisory authority.396 A majority of the court agreed the use
of the court’s discretionary supervisory authority was proper in this case.397

383. 2010 ND 88, 782 N.W.2d 626.
384. Lee, ¶ 1, 782 N.W.2d at 627-28.
385. Id. ¶ 1, 782 N.W.2d at 628.
386. Id. ¶ 2.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. ¶ 3.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. ¶ 4.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id. ¶ 5.
396. Id.
397. Id. ¶ 7, 782 N.W.2d at 629. Justice Sandstrom delivered the opinion of the court, in
which Chief Justice VandeWalle and Justices Kapsner and Crothers joined.

2010]

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

475

The majority explained the North Dakota Constitution and the North
Dakota Century Code allow the supreme court to review a district court’s
decision through the court’s supervisory authority.398 Supervisory writs,
however, are to be exercised “rarely and cautiously”—only when no alternative remedy exists and when absolutely necessary to prevent injustice.399
The court further explained supervisory writs “may be warranted when
issues of vital concern regarding matters of important public interest are
presented.”400 The issue whether a district court may hear state criminal
matters that occurred within city limits, the majority concluded, was an
issue of vital public concern, warranting the exercise of the court’s supervisory authority.401
In addressing whether a district court has jurisdiction over criminal
offenses occurring within city limits, the supreme court first analyzed the
authority of highway patrol officers.402 The court stated the authority of
highway patrol officers is broad and includes the power to enforce those
statutory provisions relating to the operation of motor vehicles and the use
and protection of highways.403 In addition, the court noted the authority of
highway patrol officers extends to all violations occurring upon the state’s
highways.404 The term highway, the court explained, should be construed
to include the streets and roads within city limits.405 Accordingly, the court
concluded the statutory prohibition against driving under suspension “on a
highway or on public or private areas to which the public has a right for
access for vehicular use in this state” applied to driving on a street within
city limits.406
The supreme court then addressed whether the existence of a city ordinance prohibiting driving under suspension superseded the application of
state law.407 The court noted under section 12.1-01-05 of the North Dakota
Century Code, “No offense defined in this title or elsewhere by law shall be
superseded by any city or county ordinance, or city or county home rule
charter, or by an ordinance pursuant to such a charter.”408 Thus, the court
held even when a city enacts an ordinance under its home rule charter, all
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.

Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶¶ 8-9.
Id. ¶ 9 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-03-09; 39-03-03 (2009)).
Id. (citing Brewer v. Ziegler, 2007 ND 207, ¶ 8, 743 N.W.2d 391, 396).
Id. ¶ 10, 728 N.W.2d at 630.
Id. ¶ 11 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-42(1)).
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-05).
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state criminal laws “remain in full force and effect within the city limits.”409
The court determined because the statutory prohibition against driving under suspension clearly applied to offenses committed within city limits, and
because the highway patrol officer had the authority to enforce the statute
within city limits, the district court had jurisdiction to hear the criminal
matter.410 Therefore, the supreme court concluded the district court erred in
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.411
Justice Maring agreed with the majority’s holding that the district court
had jurisdiction, but filed a dissent asserting the court should not have exercised its supervisory authority in this case.412 In her opinion, the State had
an adequate alternative remedy, which it failed to exercise, and, thus, the
State’s petition for a supervisory writ should have been denied.413 Justice
Maring rejected the State’s argument that as a result of its motion for
reconsideration, the State missed the time to timely file an appeal and was,
therefore, left with no adequate alternative remedy, warranting the issuance
of a supervisory writ by the court.414 She explained the proper standard
requires the court to consider whether an alternative remedy to bring the
issue to the court exists, “not whether, due to tactical choices or procedural
errors, the party has lost its right to bring an issue to this Court through an
appeal . . . .”415 Justice Maring determined the State’s failure to bring the
issue to the court through the appeal process was the direct result of the
State’s tactical and procedural choices.416 Justice Maring concluded because an alternative remedy existed and the State could have brought the
issue through an appeal, “the extraordinary remedy of issuing a supervisory
writ” was not necessary, and the State’s petition for a supervisory writ
should have been denied.417

409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.

Id. (citing State v. Brown, 2009 ND 150, ¶ 24, 771 N.W.2d 267, 275-76).
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶ 17, 728 N.W.2d at 631 (Maring, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶¶ 17-18.
Id. ¶ 20, 728 N.W.2d at 632.
Id. ¶ 21.
Id. ¶ 22.
Id. ¶¶ 22-23.
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SETTLEMENTS—BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS—
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
DAVIDSON V. STATE
In Davidson v. State,418 members of the Committee for Understanding
and Respect (Committee) appealed the district court’s judgment dismissing
their action against the State Board of Higher Education (Board).419 The
district court dismissed the Committee’s attempt to enforce a settlement
agreement against the Board and to enjoin the Board from “shortening the
time period for the Spirit Lake Tribe and the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe to
consider approving or rejecting [the] use of the ‘Fighting Sioux’ nickname
and logo” by the University of North Dakota (UND).420 The North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding the settlement agreement did not preclude UND or the Board from terminating the
use of the “Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo before the two tribes had
decided whether to approve or reject the use of the nickname and logo by
UND.421
In August 2005, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
prohibited its members from “using or displaying hostile and abusive racial
or ethnic nicknames, mascots, or imagery at the NCAA championship
events.”422 The NCAA identified UND’s use of the “Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo as prohibited under the NCAA’s newly adopted policy.423
Opposing the policy, UND and the Board sued the NCAA in October
2006.424 A year later, the parties entered into a settlement agreement.425
The agreement specified UND and the Board would dismiss the suit against
the NCAA and, in return, the NCAA would give UND until November 30,
2010, to obtain permission from the North Dakota Sioux Tribes for UND’s
use of the “Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo.426

418. 2010 ND 68, 781 N.W.2d 72.
419. Davidson, ¶ 1.
420. Id., 781 N.W.2d at 73.
421. Id. ¶ 20, 781 N.W.2d at 78.
422. Id. ¶ 2, 781 N.W.2d at 73.
423. Id.
424. Id. ¶ 3.
425. Id.
426. Id. The North Dakota Sioux Tribes referred to in the settlement agreement were the
Spirit Lake Tribe and the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. Id. UND was to secure the tribes’ “clear
and affirmative support” in order to avoid application of the NCAA’s policy. Id. The agreement
further stated that “[i]f UND does not adopt a new nickname and logo, or if the transition to a new
nickname and logo is not completed prior to August 15, 2011, then UND will be returned to the
list of institutions subject to the Policy.” Id. ¶ 4.
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In April, 2009, one of the two tribes, the Spirit Lake Tribe, agreed to
permit UND’s continued use of the “Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo.427
In May 2009, however, the Board voted to retire the nickname and logo
beginning October 1, 2009.428 The Board specified unless both tribes gave
their approval for the continued use of the nickname and logo, UND would
fully retire the name by August 1, 2010.429 As of October 1, 2009, the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe had neither granted nor denied UND permission
to continue using the name and logo.430
As a result, the Committee, which included members of the Spirit Lake
Tribe, sought to enjoin the Board from retiring the “Fighting Sioux”
nickname and logo before November 30, 2010, asserting such a termination
violated the settlement agreement between the Board, UND, and the
NCAA.431 The district court granted the Committee’s motion for a temporary restraining order.432 The Board challenged the Committee’s standing
to seek enforcement of the settlement agreement and moved to dismiss the
Committee’s complaint before filing an answer, arguing the Board had the
authority to terminate the use of the nickname and logo before November
30, 2010.433 After a hearing on the issue, the district court found the
Committee had standing to sue, but dismissed the complaint against the
Board because the court concluded the settlement agreement unambiguously allowed the Board to terminate the use of the nickname and logo
before November 30, 2010.434 The Committee appealed.435
On appeal, the Committee argued under the plain and unambiguous
language of the settlement agreement, the two tribes had until November
30, 2010, to approve the use of the “Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo and
any decision by the Board to retire the nickname and logo prior to that date
constituted a breach of the agreement.436 Specifically, the Committee
asserted, when considered in its entirety, the settlement agreement clearly
intended to provide the two tribes with “a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate ‘clear and affirmative support’ for the Fighting Sioux nickname
and logo by precluding the Board from retiring the nickname and logo
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before November 30, 2010.”437 The Board responded nothing in the language of the settlement agreement required the Board to wait until
November 30, 2010, before retiring the nickname and logo.438 The Board
further contended “when read as a whole,” the agreement allowed UND to
retire the “Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo and transition to a new
nickname and logo at any time before November 30, 2010.439
In addressing the parties’ arguments, the North Dakota Supreme Court
first explained under Article VIII of the North Dakota Constitution, the
Board has the authority to control and administer the State’s educational
institutions, such as UND.440 The court then stated nothing in the language
of the settlement agreement limited the Board’s constitutional authority or
precluded the Board from retiring the “Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo
before November 30, 2010.441 Moreover, although the settlement agreement gave UND until November 30, 2010, to obtain the approval of the two
tribes, the agreement did not require, and UND did not agree to, the continued use of the “Fighting Sioux” name and logo until that date.442 The
court noted the settlement agreement allowed UND to retain the rights over
the “Fighting Sioux” if UND chose to transition to a new nickname and
logo on November 30, 2010, or at any time before November 30, 2010.443
Accordingly, the court concluded, the plain and unambiguous language of
the agreement should be construed to allow UND to retire the “Fighting
Sioux” nickname and logo and transition to a new nickname and logo at any
time before November 30, 2010.444 Therefore, the agreement did not
provide the two tribes with the sole authority to determine the use of the
“Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo and did not preclude the Board from
terminating the usage of the nickname and logo before November 30,
2010.445
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